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Abstract 
 
 This paper tests the credibility of the bank resolution regime in the European Union in removing 
the implicit public guarantee that governments will bail-out their troubled banks, and discusses 
the implications of a resolution regime with limited credibility. It argues that the removal of the 
implicit guarantee, and thus the perceived credibility of the regime hinge greatly on the adequacy 
of funds envisaged for bank resolution in any given case, and on the willingness of a government 
to place a bank into resolution first, before bailing it out. As such, to test whether the implicit 
guarantee is removed, the paper analyses the adequacy of the envisaged funds by looking at 
their technicalities and their target-levels, starting from internal and external funding (the bail- in 
tool and capital markets) to the newly created Single Resolution Fund (SRF), National Resolution 
Funds (NRFs), Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) and the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument 
(DRI) of the ESM. This analysis comes to the conclusion that the regime might not provide 
adequate funding for every given bank resolution, and as such it creates winners and losers under 
a limitedly-credible regime. This finding can have some important economic implications. Most 
importantly, it aggravates the inconsistencies of the cost of funding of different banks. Also, where 
it fails to remove the implicit guarantee, it creates an ever closer link between the cost of funding 
of the bank and its sovereign’s credit rating instead of severing the sovereign-bank default loop. 
Nevertheless, the paper acknowledges that in order to construct a fully credible regime much 
higher sources of funding would be needed, which would pose huge opportunity losses and hurt 
the profitability of banks perhaps to a disproportionate extent. As such, the paper settles that the 
current regime might be a good compromise in terms of the limited credibility it provides. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the messy bail-outs of troubled banks during the Eurozone crisis, which eventually 
largely contributed to the sovereign debt crisis, the EU has adopted the Bank Recovery & 
Resolution Directive (BRRD) which sets out a common framework on how troubled banks 
should be dealt with in the future, aimed at severing the bank-sovereign bond and putting an 
end to bail-outs. 
 
The BRRD creates tools for precautionary and early intervention, designed to prevent bank 
failures, as well as tools to ensure “orderly resolutions” when the institution is failing but 
“resolving it”, as opposed to letting it fail under ordinary liquidation, is considered to be in the 
“public interest”. 
 
This paper focuses only on the “orderly resolutions” aspect, i.e. resolutions1 “without severe 
systemic disruptions” and without socializing the losses of credit institutions through bail-outs.2 
In particular it evaluates the regime’s credibility in achieving orderly resolutions by examining 
whether the different funds envisaged to finance the resolution of banks in trouble will be 
enough without imposing on the public’s purse. 
 
The argument put forward is that the technicalities governing the use of the funds envisaged, 
as well as the absolute amounts targeted by the funds, can severely impair their adequacy to 
finance resolution in every given bank resolution, thus ultimately public funds may be needed. 
 
This finding on its own is not however overly significant.  Indeed, it might be irrelevant in 
practice since bank resolution is not a common occurrence and resolution of a very large bank, 
or aggregate bank resolutions, are highly unlikely at the very least.  The importance of the 
argument lies in: how the lack of sufficient resolution funds undermines the credibility of the 
resolution regime, and, most importantly, how in turn a resolution regime whose credibility is 
undermined fails to eliminate implicit governmental guarantees3 and hence fails to influence 
the credit risk valuation by the bank’s creditors in a way that disciplines the bank’s perverse 
risk-taking incentives. 
 
In this regard, the regime’s success depends largely on how well it influences risk valuation by 
the banks’ creditors in general, and not just during the exceptional occurrence of a resolution. 
It is argued that the credibility of the regime, and thus its success in removing implicit 
guarantees, as evidenced through the envisaged funding, is a pivotal element in this risk-
valuation-influencing.  Nevertheless, it must be noted that there are other elements allowing 
the lasting imprint of implicit guarantees, namely the government’s willingness to place a bank 
 
 
* PhD Candidate, European University Institute 
1 
Under the BBRD, Art 1(1) ‘resolution’ is defined as the application of a resolution tool or a tool referred to in 
Article 37(9) in order to achieve one or more of the resolution objectives referred to in Article 31(2) 
2 
Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ Preamble 
para 1 
3 
An implicit guarantee represents the expectation by market participants of future bail-outs upon failure of the 
beneficiary institution. It is ‘implicit’ because the provider of the guarantee does not have to commit to bailing out 
the firm. In the case of banks, (unwilling) providers of such guarantees are governments and public authorities in 
general, given the potential disruptive effects of bank failures. See Bongini et al (2015) 
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in resolution.  For example, the resolution can still minimize moral hazard both for smaller and 
bigger banks despite the fact that the regime does not remove the moral hazard of ‘Too-big-to- 
fail’, since bail-outs would supposedly follow only after a number of s t a t e  a i d  conditions 
are satisfied, for example, approving a plan for the sufficient restructuring of the bank. 
However, that depends largely on whether a government will choose to both harm the 
reputation of its banking sector by bailing-in its banks’ creditors and also harm its own 
reputation by using taxpayer money to offset the difference when the funds are not enough. 
 
Ultimately, the regime’s credibility, and in turn its effectiveness in minimizing moral hazard and 
influencing risk-pricing, hinge greatly on two factors: (a) the adequacy of the available funds 
and (b) the actions taken by a country facing the insolvency of one of its major banks 
(whether it allows it to enter resolution before bailing it out).   Since the second factor can only 
be established  through  future  experience  with  applying  the  resolution  regime,  this  
paper discusses only the first factor: the adequacy of the available funds. 
 
The paper tests this adequacy by undertaking a detailed analysis of the intricacies of each 
source of funds available to finance the potential resolution of a bank: private funding through 
the capital markets or the bail-in tool, Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS), the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF), State Aid, and finally, the Direct Recapitalization instrument (DRI) 
under the ESM,4 to identify any potential shortcomings. 
 
This  paper  finds  that  the  absolute  amounts  of  funding  envisaged  and  the  regime’s 
technicalities  governing  the  possible funding available  severely  limit  the  adequacy of  the 
regime for financing the resolution of every given bank.  The larger the liabilities of a bank, the 
more likely it is that the funds envisaged by the regime will not be sufficient for resolution. 
Thus the regime is not fully credible.  Based on this finding, the paper then goes on to discuss 
some potential economic implications of this limited credibility.  Importantly, these implications 
include the fact that the regime not only does not remove the Too-Big-to-Fail subsidy, but it 
actually creates winners and losers, not just among creditors, but also among institutions.  In 
particular, only smaller banks, for whom the regime is credible,5 can suffer an increase of their 
cost of funding, further decreasing their competitiveness against larger banks.  As such, it 
undermines both the minimization of moral hazard (that is the positive economic implication 
of a credible resolution regime) and the influence on the bank’s cost of funding (the negative 
economic implication of a credible resolution regime).  The positive i.e. minimising moral 
hazard: because the regime is not credible for the banks that do benefit from moral hazard.  
The negative i.e. the influence of a credible regime on the bank’s cost of funding:6 again, 
because the cost will only be higher where the regime is credible, i.e. not for big banks. 
 
4 
Please note that Deposit Guarantee Schemes and the Single Resolution Fund are also forms of State Aid 
5 
And who might not even be eligible to benefit from resolution at all, if it is not considered in the public interest for 
them to enter resolution since due to the potential lack of systemic implication, thus incurring greater costs in the 
event of default given that the ‘No creditor worst off than under ordinary liquidation’ applies to resolution 
6 
On this point see a very interesting recent study by Paola Bongini, Arturo Patarnello, Matteo Pelagatti and 
Monica Rossolini, ‘How difficult is it to raise money in turbulent times?’ in Beccalli Elena Poli Federica (eds) 
Lending, Investments and the Financial Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan studies in Banking and Financial Institution, 
UK 2015) 4 finding that the reallocation of losses of bank failure on debt-holders (i.e. bail-in of creditors in 
resolution or depositor preference in liquidation) can alter the banks’ funding costs, especially when combined 
with the regulatory changes to capital adequacy standards (i.e. more equity). They explain that while ‘a larger 
loss-absorbing buffer makes debt safer and potentially cheaper, bail-in powers and the possible introduction of
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Lastly, some remarks on how the inadequacy of funds envisaged can influence a sovereign’s 
decision to place a bank into resolution are provided as well as some thoughts on what the 
potential (negative) implications of a credible regime would be.  The paper concludes that 
given all the possible implications involved, the regime’s limited credibility might be a tolerable 
compromise after all. 
 
 
 
2. Financing a bank resolution: the (in)adequacy of funds envisaged 
 
 
As mentioned, the funds envisaged for bank resolution are: private funding through the capital 
markets or the bail-in tool, Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS), the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF), State Aid, and finally, the Direct Recapitalization instrument (DRI) under the ESM.7 
 
For the regime to be credible, the aforementioned funds should be enough to keep the critical 
functions of the institution (i.e. its commercial functions) running while the bank enters 
resolution, and enough to guarantee that covered deposits will be paid out to avoid bank runs 
and contagion to the bank’s counterparties and to the real economy. 
 
If the overall funds are not enough for any given institution, then the regime is not credible 
enough and the implicit guarantee is not removed, thus its ability to influence risk-valuation to 
its full potential is hindered.  If they are enough then the regime is credible and it has better 
chances of influencing risk-valuation. 
 
 
 
2.1 Private funding: Internal and External 
 
The adequacy of resolution funds can be achieved through the minimisation of the cost of 
resolution since the more costly a resolution is, the higher the probability that public money will 
be needed to supplement resolution funds.8  Minimising the cost of resolution hinges greatly on 
early intervention9 and on maximising the pool of the private-financing of the resolution: both 
internally through bail-inable creditors; and externally through investors.  The next section 
explores whether the regime’s provisions do actually maximise the pool of private funding. 
 
2.1.1 Exemptions from bail-in 
 
‘[B]ail-in’, i.e. the write-down and conversion of liabilities of an institution under resolution,10 ‘if 
sufficient, can…avoid the need for public funding.’11   However, the BRRD contains important 
 
 
 
depositor preference laws, combined with high levels of asset encumbrance, magnify the expected losses of 
unsecured debt-holders in the event of bank failure, driving upwards the issuance cost of this class of debt’ 
7 
Please note that Deposit Guarantee Schemes and the Single Resolution Fund are also forms of State Aid. The 
way the term “State Aid” is used here is narrow to reflect only the situations where aid is given indirectly through 
the state where the failing bank is incorporated to the failing bank and attaches conditionality to the state itself 
8 
BRRD Article 31(2) para 2 requires the resolution authority, when pursuing resolution objectives, to minimise the 
cost of resolution 
9 
Please note that this paper does not explore other tools facilitating early intervention and diminishing resolution 
costs such as the sale of business tool (Art 38-39), the bridge bank tool (Art 40-41 BRRD), the asset separation 
tool (Art 42 BRRD), 
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statutory exceptions from bail-ins, minimizing instead of maximizing the pool of bail-inable 
creditors.  Covered deposits,12 secured liabilities, derivatives, and inter-institution liabilities with 
maturities of less than seven days are all exempted.13   The Single Resolution Board (SRB), 
which is the European Agency in charge of administering a bank resolution, also has 
considerable discretion to waive losses for certain unsecured bondholders, and possibly 
unguaranteed depositors,14 in situations subjectively interpreted by the SRB as a “crisis” or to 
avoid “serious disturbance to the economy” 15 (which could have a very wide interpretation 
given that the imposition of bail-in is bound to severely diminish confidence, not only in the 
bank involved but in the banking sector of the country as a whole, causing bank runs and 
deterring investments). 
 
The excuse that statutory exemptions from bail-in are necessary to avoid the danger of 
systemic risks and the hindering of financing conditions is unimpressive.16   Protecting creditors 
is relevant only to the extent required to achieve the resolution objectives. 17    The primary 
objectives of resolution, as expressed in the BRRD, are: to resolve the bank in a way that 
ensures the continuity of critical functions, the prevention of contagion, and the minimisation of 
public intervention and thus moral hazard.18   If follows that, such an extensive protection of 
creditors  -other  than  covered  depositors,  and  the  creditors  needed  to  maintain  critical 
functions- should not have been in place since it minimizes the available amount to be bailed- 
in, and thus maximises the potential need for public intervention,19 contrary to the express 
objectives of the BRRD. 
 
The minimisation instead of maximisation of private funding is further aggravated in this case, 
since the non-exempted creditors are likely to be required to undergo a deeper haircut to 
recapitalize the bank, to the point that they might be placed in a worse position than they would 
had been under ordinary liquidation.  As such, under the “no creditor worse off than under 
liquidation” (NCWOL) principle20 these disadvantaged creditors are entitled to compensation, 
 
 
 
10 
BRRD Art 2(1)(57) 
11 
John Armour, ‘Making Bank Resolution Credible’ in E Ferran, N Moloney and J Payne (eds), Oxford Handbook 
of Financial Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014) (SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393998) 3 
12 
For the definition of covered deposits the BRRD refers to Directive 2014/49/EU, which clarifies in Article 6 that 
“Member States shall ensure that the coverage level for the aggregate deposits of each depositor is EUR 100 000 
in the event of deposits being unavailable” 
13 
BRRD Art 44(2) of course also salaries, deposit guarantee schemes held in the bank, liabilities of social and tax 
authorities etc are also exempted (BRRD Art 44(2)(g) 
14 
C Goodhard E Avgouleas, A Critical Evaluation of Bail-ins as Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms' (2014) CERP 
Discussion Paper No 10065, 13; Even though Article 44(2) paragraph 4 BRRD empowers the resolution authority 
to bail-in deposits that exceed the coverage level. 
15 
SRM Regulation Art 27(5)(c); BRRD Art 43(3) 
16 
Benedict Udoye ‘Depositors’ Priority over Senior Unsecured Bondholders: A clog in the Bank Resolution 
Process?’ (2015) University of Zurich, 24 accessed 15/04/2015 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560321>) 26 
17 
Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ Preamble 
para 1 Para 2 
18 
BRRD Art 31(2) 
19 
BRRD Art 31(2)(c) 
20 
Article 34 (g) BRRD 
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which does not derive from taxpayers’ money.21   However, such compensation claims will 
further increase the resolution costs, and as such the risk of resorting to public funds. 
 
2.1.2 Minimum bail-inable liabilities requirement 
 
In light of these exemptions, and to ensure that there are some resources available on the 
balance sheet to absorb losses, the BRRD requires institutions to hold a minimum amount of 
‘own funds and eligible liabilities’22 in a form which can be readily bailed-in:23 the Minimum 
Eligible Liabilities requirement (‘MREL’).24   An estimated reference level of MREL of 10% of 
total liabilities has been suggested by the impact assessment of the BRRD,25 however the final 
amount  of  MREL  remains  to  be  determined  on  a  case-by-case  basis  by  resolution 
authorities.26 
 
Moreover, in order to ensure some bail-in does take place, there is a prohibition on any 
contribution being made from resolution funds—whether national or the Eurozone’s Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF)—unless at least 8% of the outstanding liabilities of the firm have been 
recapitalised by bailing-in shareholders and eligible creditors.27   Although this is only ‘placing a 
floor’, on the level of bail-inable claims a financial firm must issue and more bail-in can take 
place to meet the needs of resolution, it is also possible that this will also place a cap on the of 
bail-inable claims a financial firm will issue.28   Therefore, the success of bail-in is linked directly 
to the institution’s capital structure and the designing and monitoring of this new form of 
regulatory capital by the supervisor.29   In either case, it is important that the supervisors not 
only oversee that such debt is raised, but also that the parties holding the bail-inable debt are 
 
 
21 
The FSB precludes taxpayer money as the source of compensation to creditors with a claim under NCWOL, but 
does not provide a source for such compensation 
22 
BRRD Art 45(1) 
23 
‘Bail-inable’ debt: long-term debt which is not already counted as Tier 1 or 2 capital, which is free from any 
guarantees or self-funding by the firm and which is not associated with derivative transactions. Such liabilities 
must governed by the laws of jurisdictions which recognise the decision of a resolution authority to write down the 
debt under Art 45(5) BRRD (Thus this definition can be problematic in cross-border resolutions); eligible liabilities 
for the MREL requirement must satisfy the following conditions under Article 45(4) BRRD: (a) the instrument is 
issued and fully paid up; (b) the liability is not owed to, secured by or guaranteed by the institution itself; (c) the 
purchase of the instrument was not funded directly or indirectly by the institution; (d) the liability has a remaining 
maturity of at least one year; (e) the liability does not arise from a derivative; (f) the liability does not arise from a 
deposit which benefits from preference in the national insolvency hierarchy in accordance with Article 108. 
24 
SRM Regulation, Rec (83)-(84) and Art 3(1)(49), 7(3)(d), 8(9)(o) and 12. 
25 
Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document ‘Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution 
of credit institutions and investment firms, SWD(2012) 166/3, 46; EBA,’ Final Draft Regulatory Technical 
Standards on criteria for determining the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities under 
Directive 2014/59/EU’ (03 July 2015) EBA/RTS/2015/05, 6 
26 
Subject to the BRRD criteria BRRD Art 45(6); and the pending consultation on the matter by the European 
Banking Authority EBA, ‘Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on criteria for determining the minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities under Directive 2014/59/EU’ (28 November 2014) 
EBA/CP/2014/41 Accessed 16/04/2015 
<http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/911034/EBA+CP+2014+41+%28CP+on+draft+RTS+on+MREL%2 
9.pdf>, 4 
27 
BRRD Art 44(5) and (8); BRRD Art 37(10)(a) 
28 
J Armour (above n 11) 23 
29 
J Armour (above n 11) 31, 21 
Page 7 of23  
not systemically important themselves30 so as to prevent systemic risk and contagion to the 
bank’s bail-inable creditors from a resolution 
 
2.1.3 External forms of private funding 
 
Given the low percentages of the minimum bail-in requirements and the extensive exemptions, 
other forms of private funding may be necessary, for example market funding.31      However, 
market funding is likely to vanish unless creditors are given guarantees that they will not be 
bailed-in.32   Such guarantees are partially given by excluding short-term interbank creditors 
(inter-institution liabilities with maturities of less than seven days) from the bail-in.33    Excluding 
these short-term liabilities minimises their risk and thus their cost.  As such, the bank is more 
incentivised to act in a procyclical manner and issue short-term liabilities at turbulent times. 
As seen above in section 2.1.1, excluded liabilities, as well as the capital structure of the bank, 
can ultimately have a negative impact on the robustness of the bail-in. 
 
In addition, the problem of raising funding is further aggravated in the current adjustment 
period.  Institutions are more risk-averse and are in the process of deleveraging on a massive 
scale to remove problematic assets from their balance sheets to meet new capital 
requirements,34 making it unlikely that they will be willing to increase their leverage to provide 
funding in a failing bank.  Therefore, there is a great possibility that private funding overall will 
not be enough. 
 
 
 
2.2 Pre-funded Funds: DGS, SRF, NRFs 
 
To avoid burdening the public’s purse, National resolution Funds (NRFs) and the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF), funded by the participating financial institutions,35 can be used, along 
with the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGSs), to make good certain shortfalls. 
 
2.2.1 Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) 
 
The DGSs’ contribution in the open-bank resolution is limited to the amounts that would be 
required to pay out to covered depositors in normal insolvency proceedings,36 in accordance 
 
 
 
30 
J Armour (above n 11) 23 
31 
Steven L Schwarz, ‘Systemic risk’ (2008) 97(1) Georgetown Law Journal 
32 
Martin Hellwig, ‘Yes Virginia, There is a European Banking Union! But It May Not Make Your Wishes Come 
True’ (2014) Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, 17 
33 
BRRD Art 43(2) 
34 
IMF, ‘Global Financial Stability Report – The Quest for Lasting Stability’ (April 2012) The IMF estimates that 58 
major banks in the EU could reduce their balance sheets by €2 trillion, or around 7%, by the end of 2013, fearing 
that this deleveraging could have a negative impact on the credit supply within the euro area, posing a systemic 
danger; Giancarlo Corsetti Lars P. Feld Philip R. Lane Lucrezia Reichlin Hélène Rey Dimitri Vayanos Beatrice 
Weder di Mauro, A New Start for the Eurozone: Dealing with Debt (2015 CERP PRESS), 56 Simon Tilford 
arguing that even where banks’ funding costs are very low such as France and Italy debt would become 
unsustainable because the stagnation results from private sector deleveraging 
35 
Both credit institutions and applicable investment firms; BRRD Rec 107 the contributions must be proportional 
to the degree of credit, liquidity and market risk incurred by the institutions 
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with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle.  Since losses from payments to covered depositors 
cannot logically occur unless the bank’s net worth is negative, the DGS’s responsibility does 
not go beyond bringing a bank’s net worth back to zero.37 
 
The DGSs are meant to be financed partially (75%) ex-ante through levies on the banking 
industry.38   However, the target level is set at only 0.8% of covered deposits.39   The low target 
level renders them a rather weak tool, especially since even though DGSs only insure the 
claims of covered depositors, the government arguably impliedly insures all depositors and 
stands behind the DGS40 where the DGS is unable to support depositors’ confidence.41   If they 
become depleted, national DGSs can borrow from DGSs in other Member States through a 
mutual borrowing facility, to be implemented by 31/12/2020.42   Until then, the possibility for 
using public funds to supplement depleted DGSs is rather dangerous. 
 
While DGS can only be used to pay covered (and arguably unguaranteed) deposits, other 
industry-funded resolution funds are being put in place to finance the resolution itself if private 
funding is not enough on its own.  If those funds are still not enough, public assistance and the 
use of the ESM might be necessary. 
 
2.2.2 Resolution Funds: insufficient backstop 
 
The BRRD subjects the use of the resolution funds, either nationally43 or through the SRM,44 to 
the condition that stakeholders must have contributed at least 8% of total liabilities to loss 
absorption.45   This contribution is limited to medium-term financing of no more than 5% of the 
bank’s total liabilities,46 and must be used exclusively for the implementation of resolution tools 
and  resolution powers. 47     Therefore,  the  SRF  can  extend  short-term funding  to  maintain 
systemically important operations at least between the time the bank entered into resolution 
until the resolution plan is approved and implemented;48 or provide guarantees to potential 
investors to facilitate the resolution procedures, but it cannot be used directly to absorb losses 
 
 
 
36 
R M Lastra, R Ayadi,’Proposals for reforming Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Europe’ (2010) 11(3) Journal of 
Banking Regulation 210–222, 212 noting that DGS financing is only available in insolvency proceedings; SRM 
Regulation Rec 81, 110 & Art. 79; BRRD Rec 71 & Art 109 
37 
BRRD Red (110) & Art 109(1); C Hadjiemmanuil ‘Bank Resolution Financing in the Banking Union’ (2015) LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 6/2015, 24 
38 
Memo 10/318, ‘Deposit Guarantee Schemes – Frequently Asked Questions’ Available from: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-318_en.htm?locale=EN> 
39 
By 3 July 2014, the available financial means of each DGS must have reached a target level of at least 0.8% of 
its members’ total covered deposits; DGSD, art. 10(2), sub para 1 
40 
M Lastra, R Ayadi (above n 36) 212 
41 
ibid 215 noting that: ‘The rationale for depositor protection is the…inability of ordinary depositors to monitor the 
riskiness of banks...and the potentially severe cost of deposit losses to individual savers.’ 
42 
Memo (above n 38) 
43 
Proposed Recovery and Resolution Directive, Art 91 
44 
Proposed SRM Regulation, Arts 64-66 
45 
BRRD Art 44 (5)(a); BRRD Art 37(10)(a) 
46 
BRRD Rec (73)–(74), & Arts 44(5)(b), 44(7); SRM Regulation Rec (78) & Art 27(7)(b) 
47 
SRM Regulation Rec. (101) 
48 
At least for 24 hours SRM Regulation, Art 18(7); 32 hours (24+8) if the Commission or the Council amend the 
Resolution Scheme 
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of the failed bank or to recapitalize it.49   This is at least the case until all unsecured, non- 
preferred liabilities have been written down in full.50   After that, the SRF can intervene beyond 
its 5% cap.  However, this intervention will always be subject to the absolute limit set by the 
fund’s total available resources.  For example, the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), for Member 
States in the European Banking Union (EBU), sets its initial target at only 1% of the covered 
deposits of credit institutions within the EBU, amounting merely to a level of €55 billion by 
January 2024 after an eight-year transition period that begins on January 1, 2016.51   During 
the transition period, the SRF will consist of “national compartments” corresponding to each 
participating Member State’s resolution authority and fund.  An Intergovernmental Agreement 
(IGA)  provides  for  the  activation  of  the  mutualisation  of  risk  between  the  national 
compartments  during  the  8-year  transition  period. 52      For  non-EBU  Members,  National 
Resolution  Funds’  (NRFs) 53  target  level  is  at  0.8%.    For  example,  the  German  Bank 
Restructuring Fund is targeted at a level of €70 billion.54 
 
Given the numbers involved, the targets of the resolution funds are unlikely to be sufficient.55 
The SRF is insufficient to deal with an aggregate crisis, or even individual crises, given that 
some banks account for a huge part of their domestic GDP.56   It is needless to say that non- 
EBU NRFs are unlikely to be sufficient in dealing with individual domestic crises under their 0.8% 
target.  As Professor Martin Hellwig points out, these numbers are much too small to ensure 
even interim funding when it comes to institutions like Deutsche Bank, with liabilities over €2 
trillion, or even Commerzbank or Landesbanken with liabilities in the €100 billion range.57 
 
Arguably, the BRRD recognizes this and holds that in the event that a resolution must take 
place at a time when the funds raised are insufficient, both the SRF and the NRFs will have the 
power to raise ex post contributions by the institutions.58   If then the ex-ante and ex-post 
contributions are not sufficient for the SRF’s intended intervention, the legislation enables the 
SRF  to  borrow additional  sums  and/or  enter  into  other  contractual  arrangements  for  the 
purpose of attracting third-party financial support.59   However, the SRF’s borrowing capacity 
depends critically on the industry’s lending capacity, which is bound to be seriously impaired 
during a crisis as described above.60   It also depends on the existence of a credible guarantee, 
for example by the ESM,61 which as discussed below is not as strong as it was intended to be. 
 
 
49 
SRM Regulation Rec (100) & Art 76; BRRD, Rec (103) 1st sentence, & Art 101 
50 
SRM Regulation, art. 27(9)–(10); BRRD Art 59 
51 
SRM Regulation Ch 2 “Single Resolution Fund” Arts 67-79; Article 69(1) 
52 
Council, Legislative Acts and other Instruments, Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to 
the SRF 8457/14, LIMITE, EF 121, Ecofin 342, Art 3 
53 
BRRD Rec 103-104 
54 
M Hellwig (above n 32) 19 
55 
M Hellwig (above n 32) 19; C Hadjiemmanuil (above n 37) 1 
56 
CERP 2015 (above n 44), 66 giving the example of IMG accounting for 60% of German GDP 
57 
M Hellwig (above n 32) 19 
58 
BRRD Art 104(1) SRM Regulation Rec (102) & Art 69‒71; BRRD Rec (105)‒(107) & Art 102 
59 
SRM Regulation, Rec (102), Art 73 
60 
M Hellwig (above n 32) 21 
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George S Zavvos and Stella Kaltsouni, ‘The single resolution mechanism in the european banking union: Legal 
Foundation, Governance Structure and Financing’ in Matthias Haentjens & Bob Wessels (eds), Research 
Handbook on Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, forthcoming, 2015) 
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Page 10 of23  
Furthermore, in any case, ex-post funding either through extraordinary levies or borrowing can 
induce pro-cyclical, destabilizing effects on the participating banks.62 
 
 
 
2.3 ESM to fund directly bank resolutions 
 
Despite the initial hype,63 the final implementation sets strict limits on the utilization of the 
ESM 64  and,  in  particular,  the  ESM’s  Direct  Recapitalisation  Instrument  (DRI),  imposing 
grueling conditions for its activation.65 
 
The DRI is available only to banks whose recapitalization through the DRI is considered 
indispensable, because the beneficiary institution is: 
(i) unable to meet the capital requirements established by the ECB in its capacity as 
supervisor; 
(ii) unable to obtain sufficient capital from private sources and the foreseen bail-in would 
not be sufficient to address the anticipated capital shortfall; 
(iii) systemically relevant or poses a serious threat to the financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole and of its Member States.66 
Also, the requesting ESM Member has to be unable to provide financial assistance to the 
beneficiary institution without very serious effects on its own fiscal sustainability, or where 
other solutions risk endangering the ESM Member’s continuous access to markets.67 
 
Importantly, the ESM Board of Governors, i.e. the euro area’s finance ministers, takes the 
decision  to  grant  financial  assistance  based  on  the  assessment  of  the  Troika 68  for  the 
requesting  Member  State  and  the  ESM’s  Managing  Director,  the  competent  resolution 
authority and the ECB in its capacity as supervisor for the requesting institution.69   Crucially, 
like all ESM decisions, this decision is reached by ‘mutual agreement’, that is; unanimity,70 thus 
giving a veto power to each government in the Eurozone.71   Therefore, on top of the stringent 
eligibility criteria, the assistance-granting decision is highly political.  As such the decision to 
use the DRI might well rely on the extent to which the deciding countries will themselves be 
affected by the resolution. 
 
 
 
 
62 
C Hadjiemmanuil (above n 37) 27 
63 
Eurogroup document ‘ESM direct recapitalization instrument – Main Features of the operational framework and 
way forward” (Luxembourg, 20 June 2013) Stating that the DRI’s objective was ‘to preserve the financial stability 
of the euro area as a whole and of its member states in line with Article 3 of the ESM Treaty, and to help remove 
the risk of contagion from the financial sector to the sovereign by allowing the recapitalization of institutions 
directly’ 
64 
Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (2 February 2012), as amended 
65 
ESM, ‘Guideline on Financial Assistance for the Direct Recapitalisation of Institutions’ (8 Dec 2014) 
66 
ESM, ‘FAQ on the ESM direct recapitalisation instrument’8 December 2014 Q6; ESM DRI Guideline, Art. 3(1) 
67 
Ibid Q5; ESM DRI Guideline, Arts. 2(1) and 3(2)(a) 
68 
The Commission, the ECB and the IMF 
69 
ESM DRI Guideline, art. 4(2), third sentence, and (3) 
70 
Mutual agreement’ means ‘unanimity of the members participating in the vote’, with abstentions excluded from 
consideration ESM Treaty Art 4(3) 
71 
ESM Treaty Art 5(6)(f) and (g) 
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Apart from the fact that few countries/institutions will be eligible to use the DRI, this strict 
conditionality also pushes states to admit severe fiscal weaknesses, making even eligible 
countries reluctant to apply for the DRI, since admitting to such fiscal weakness could itself 
trigger ‘the negative bank-sovereign spiral’.72 
 
In addition, for the DRI to be applied the state is still required to contribute to the 
recapitalisation.  For example, if the beneficiary institution has insufficient equity to reach the 
requisite Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) of 4.5%,73 the state is required to make a capital 
injection to reach this level before receiving ESM assistance. Beyond the 4.5% requirement, 
the national contribution is also subject to a floor of 10% (or, in the transitional period until the 
end of 2016, 20%) of the ESM’s contribution.74 The ESM Board of Governors will have the 
right to partially or fully suspend an ESM Member’s contribution in the exceptional cases when 
the ESM Member is not able to contribute up-front.75   However, it is unlikely that the Board 
would apply the restriction because of fears of discrimination.76   In any case, such exemption 
comes with the price of macroeconomic conditionality and indemnities to the ESM for any loss 
attributable to the country’s non-participation.77 
 
Finally,  the  ESM  direct  financing  tool  is  not  available  in  cases  where  the  costs  of 
recapitalization for banks result from losses of pre-existing bad assets, 78 since this would 
amount to an ex post facto Europeanisation of the costs from past national supervisory 
failures.79   Therefore, its use should be limited to cases where financial or economic distress is 
anchored exclusively in the financial sector and is not directly related to fiscal or structural 
policies.80 
 
Apart from the ESM’s weaknesses in applicability, the ESM’s capacity to credibly play the role 
of the ultimate fiscal backstop for the SRM in a major systemic crisis has also been doubted.81 
It has been argued that its target level for its DRI, set at EUR 60 billion82 (out of its EUR 500 
billion total lending capacity), is set too low to be able to deal with a major crisis, even if that 
sum is to be applied after all the aforementioned tools.83   As Hellwig points out ‘any amount 
would be insufficient in the 2-digit billions level’.84    As such, only the ECB, a central bank  
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deter future crises’ (24th June 2014) Accessed 15/04/2015 <http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1369- 
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77 
ESM DRI Guideline, Art 9(3)‒(4) 
78 
‘Joint Statement of the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland’ (25 Sept 2012) 
79 
C Hadjiemmanuil (above n 37) 
80 
ESM Treaty Art 1 
81 
M Hellwig (above n 32) 17; IMF, ‘2014 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area: Concluding Statement of the 
IMF Mission’ (June 19, 2014), para. 10 
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Eurogroup document on ESM’s DRI 
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M Hellwig (above n 32) 
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ibid 
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 able of issuing unlimited amounts of cash, can play this role of the lender of last resort and   
not the ESM which has been built to tackle only liquidity and solvency problems.85 
 
The use of ESM funds for direct recapitalisations could have put a stop to bailouts.86  However, 
based on the strict conditionality of the ESM’s direct application and its low target amount, the 
ESM’s role as a direct fiscal backstop is incredibly limited for the foreseeable future.87 
 
 
 
2.4 State Aid 
 
If the aforementioned conditions are not satisfied, and during the interim phase up until the full 
implementation of the SRF and the ESM’s DRI, or where recapitalization is done for 
precautionary purposes,88 the ESM Member could still access the indirect State Aid loans for 
bank recapitalization.89 
 
The conditions here are that: (i) there are no alternatives for the recapitalization due to inability 
to meet capital shortfalls from the private sector, therefore shareholders, creditors and banks 
should bear the cost of resolution before any external funding is granted; 90  (ii) the ESM 
Member cannot recapitalize the institution without incurring very adverse effects on its own 
fiscal sustainability; (iii) it has systemic relevance or threatens the financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole.  Also, for a loan to be granted the beneficiary ESM Member should further 
demonstrate its ability to reimburse the loan granted, even in cases in which it would not be 
able to recover the capital injected in the beneficiary institution.91 
 
These criteria are meant to control state aid loans to minimize bailouts.  However, as shown 
by the decade-long fight over the public guarantees for the Landesbanken, where significant 
political stakes are involved, state aid control can be weak and slow.92   With the effects of the 
crisis still very vivid, any government that wants to maintain a bank will simply claim that if the 
bank is resolved, financial stability will perish.  In that case it is not easy for the Commission to 
question whether the bank really poses a threat to financial stability.  This created an acute 
paradox.  If the ESM Member’s finances are not thought to be at risk to qualify for the DRI, 
indirect recapitalization would worsen the ESM member’s finances enough to eventually put it 
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P De Grauwe, ‘The European Central Bank: The Lender of Last Resort in the Government Bond Market?’, 
CESIFO Working Paper, No 3569 , September 2011; G S Zavvos S Kaltsouni (above n 50); H Minsky, Stabilizing 
the Unstable Economy (Yale University Press, 1986) 279 – 282; G Zavvos S Kaltsouni (above n 50) 
86 
E Avgouleas D W Arner, ‘The Eurozone Debt Crisis and the European Banking Union: A Cautionary Tale of 
Failure and Reform’ (2013) 24 
87 
C Hadjiemmanuil (above n 37) 21 
88 
ESM DRI Guideline Art 8(1) 
89 
C Kerle, ‘Burden-sharing Under State Aid Rules: Evolution, State of Play and the Way Ahead’ 109 
90 
E Avgouleas D W Arner (above n 70) 41; See European Parliament, ‘”Bail-ins” in recent banking resolutions and 
state aid cases’ (7 July 2016) PE 574.395 
91 
ESM Treaty Art 3 
92 
In the end, the 2001 agreement between Commissioner Monti and the German government enabled the 
European Commission to establish the prohibition of guarantees for public banks as a form of illicit state aid 
without having to go to court. See the European Commission’s Press Release IP/02/343 01/03/2002 of 
February 28, 2002, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-343_en.htm?locale=en. The 
Commission accepted a 4-year transition period to raise additional funding under government guarantees 
Page 13 of23  
 
at risk.93   The ESM’s guidelines take note of this paradox and allow for a direct recapitalization 
where indirect assistance is bound to trigger by itself a drastic deterioration of the ESM 
Member’s fiscal prospects.94 
 
To avoid this outcome and deter such loans, strict conditionality has been attached to state aid 
loans, often going as far as to doubt their legality.   Therefore, state aid is an absolute last 
resort due to extraordinary circumstances i.e. the threat of sovereign insolvency.  As such, its 
role in bank resolution should be very limited. 
 
3. The implications of inadequacy, limited credibility and credibility 
 
3.1 Inadequacy 
The core objective of bank resolution is to enable non-viable banks to exit the market “without 
severe systemic disruptions and without exposing taxpayers to loss”.95   The BRRD seeks to 
do so by involving creditors in the sharing of the burden of bank resolution. 
 
The regime’s emphasis on placing the burden on the institutions’ creditors has been marketed 
as aiming to ‘save the taxpayers’ money’ and to ‘break the bank-sovereign loop’.  In reality, the 
regime’s most important potential is succeeding in eliminating an explicit or an implicit bail-out 
assurance, thus changing the risk calculation of the institution.96   As such, a credible no-bailout 
regime increases the price of the risk, and places losses flowing from such increased risk with 
the institution’s creditors and shareholders, deterring excessive debt accumulation ex ante97 
and incentivising creditors and stakeholders as gatekeepers to support the curtailing of 
excessive risk-taking by banks.98     Therefore, it is crucial that the resolution regime in the EU 
communicates credibly that there will be no more bailouts.99 
 
Unfortunately, it is doubtful that it does so credibly.  For the new resolution regime to avoid all 
future bail-outs, the funds raised through the envisaged bail-in under the BRRD (estimated at 
10% of the bank’s total liabilities), and the funds of the SRF (targeted at 1% of the total 
deposits), as supplemented by the DGS and any potential external funding, must be enough to 
cover all expenses of bank resolution (financing or resolution and loss absorption) in the 
absence of a credible fiscal backstop, the ESM not being one.   Given firstly, the BRRD’s 
several exceptions to the bail-inable liabilities;100 secondly, the SRF’s and DGS’s low target 
levels; and thirdly, the difficulty of accessing external funding through the markets in times of 
turbulence: it is unlikely that this will be the case. 
 
93 
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ESM DRI Guideline, arts. 2(1), third sentence, and 3(2)(a), first sentence 
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(2011) 5; Oana Toader ‘Quantifying and Explaining Implicit Public Guarantees for European Banks’ (9 October 25, 
2013) Univ. Orléans, LEO 1-30 
97 
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98 
HM Treasury, ‘Banking Reform: Delivering Stability and Supporting A Sustainable Economy’ (June, 2012) 1-57, 
47; J-H Binder, ‘Resolution: Concepts, Requirements and Tools’ in J-H Binder and D Singh (eds), Bank Recovery 
and Resolution in Europe, (Oxford University Press 2015) available from: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2499613>, 2 
99 
J Armour (above n 11); EU Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper: The effects of temporary state 
aid rules adopted in the context of the financial and economic crisis’, SEC(2011) 1126 final, 20 November 2012 
100 
BRRD, Art 48(1)(e), Art 108 
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Nevertheless, in pure practical resolution terms, the recapitalization of banks with fiscal 
resources might be the exception rather than the rule.101   First of all, the new resolution regime 
is focused on early intervention and avoidance of regulatory forbearance to trigger resolution 
on time, minimizing the ultimate accumulated losses.  This is particularly the case if effective 
recovery and resolution plans are in place ready to be used once resolution is triggered. After 
that, the private sector must finance at least 13% (8% bail-in + 5% from the SRF) of the failed 
bank’s total liabilities, before public funds are used in the resolution (unless the state holds a 
substantial amount of the bank’s shares and is bailed-in as it happened in several cases).102   
Where there is a high loss-absorbing capacity requirement in place the initial 13% percentage 
is bound to increase substantially to absorb more losses, especially taking into account the 
national DGSs’ contribution.103   Therefore, it is only where the bail-in is not enough and the 
Resolution Funds’ contribution proves to be insufficient to cover the resulting gap that an 
intervention with public funds may be needed.104 
 
 
 
3.2 Limited credibility 
 
The fact that the use of public funds might be the exception rather than the rule does not 
change the fact that the perception of the inadequacy of funds limits the credibility of the 
regime.  The limited credibility of the regime has important implications on the cost of funding 
of banks, and inconsistencies thereof, influencing bank competitiveness; and on the 
sovereign’s willingness to place a bank in resolution in the first place.  Finally, the 
implications of the credibility of the regime could, and should, influence the important decision 
of whether it is in the public interest to place a bank in resolution. 
 
 
3.2.1 Cost of funding implications 
 
The  reallocation  of  losses  of  bank  failure  upon  debt-holders  (i.e.  bail-in of creditors in 
resolution or depositor preference in liquidation), especially combined with the regulatory- 
driven changes to funding structures (i.e. more equity), can produce changes of bank funding 
costs on either side of the scale.   On the one hand, a larger loss-absorbing buffer makes 
debt safer and potentially cheaper.   On the other hand, bail-in powers and the possible 
introduction of depositor preference laws, combined with high levels of asset encumbrance, 
 
 
 
101 
C Hadjiemmanuil (above n 37) 22 
102 
The justification is that ‘[i]t should be the financial industry, as a whole, that finances the stabilisation of 
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2016) PE 574.395 for a summary of these cases 
103 
Thomas Huertas and María J. Nieto, ‘How much is enough? The Case of the Resolution Fund in Europe’, 
VoxEU.org, 18 March 2014,  http://www.voxeu.org/article/ensuring-european-resolution-fundlarge-enough; C 
Hadjiemmanuil (above n 37) 37 
104 
SRM Regulation, Rec (79); C Hadjiemmanuil (above n 37) 29 
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magnify the expected losses that unsecured debt-holders will suffer in the event of a bank 
failure and will likely drive upwards the cost at issuance of this class of debt instruments.106 
 
In a recent study conducted by Paola Bongini, Arturo Patarnello, Matteo Pelagatti and Monica 
Rossolini, it was found that in fact the cost of bank bonds at issuance increased dramatically, 
signaling a perceived increase in bank risk by debt markets. 107    Bongini et al found that 
secured and unsecured debt spreads have increased not only because of a perceived higher 
probability of default for banks, and ensuing expected losses, but also because of the 
diminution of implicit guarantees for bailing-out banks.108 
 
The cost at issuance of bank bonds is linked to the characteristics of the issue itself, (i.e. 
issuance maturity, size and rating), and to any accompanying guarantees, direct or implicit, 
private or public.109 
 
Thus, the new regime’s limited credibility for big banks, suggesting the perseverance of 
implicit guaranties, implies a funding cost advantage for the beneficiary banks.  This 
advantage further distorts the already distorted competition amongst credit institutions of 
different sizes and can influence the beneficiary banks’ risk-taking decisions inducing them to 
take on more risk than they would normally take.    Abusive risk-taking practices in turn make 
the use of the guarantee, and thus tax-payers’ money, more likely. 
 
 
3.2.2 Sovereign-beneficiary bank cost and decision to place in resolution implications 
Implicit guarantees also imply a dangerously intimate link between the bank and the sovereign, 
including potential negative feedback effects from the value of sovereign debt to the value of 
bank debt and vice versa.110 
 
The case under the bail-out regime used to be that sovereigns stepping in to save the bank 
augmented sovereign debt, and as such, often led to a sovereign debt crisis.111   The case 
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noteworthy given that during the crisis deposits experienced negative interest rates for the first time. 
107 
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108 
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Market Trends 1-22 
111 
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under bail-ins is the worst of both worlds.  Banks’ holdings of sovereigns are marked by a 
strong home bias.112   And, sovereigns which used ESM funds to bail-out banks have become 
the banks’ biggest shareholders, putting them at risk of bail-in. Therefore the argument 
becomes cyclical.  A state facing a financial shock places its banks at risk, and insolvent banks 
feed back to the state finances.113 
 
The link between sovereigns and banks affects significantly the banks’ cost of funding.114     
Cardillo  and Zaghini115 and Zaghini116 find that in crisis periods the effects of a deteriorating 
sovereign  creditworthiness  spill-over  to  home banks. 117     Similarly,  a  paper by the  CGFS 
analysing the impact of sovereign risk on the cost of bank funding for a sample of 534 
unsecured fixed rate senior bonds from 114 banks in 14 advanced economies for the years 
2006 and 2010 finds that while in normal times the characteristics of the sovereign have 
virtually no effect on the cost of funding,118 in crisis time, a large part of the spread at launch on 
bank bonds (nearly 30%) reflects the conditions of the sovereign.  This percentage increases 
to 50% for countries for which concerns over public finance conditions are more pronounced. 
Such results imply a significant funding cost advantage for banks in countries with high 
creditworthiness. 119     This  means  that  the  possibility  that  the  sovereign  will  not  be  able 
financially to bail-out the banks has a significant impact on the funding cost of the bank. 
 
Where the sovereign is financially able to bail-out a failing bank, there are strong political 
incentives that it will choose to do so.  Given the insufficiency of the resolution funds, it is 
doubtful that a sovereign will choose to hurt both the confidence in its banking system by 
bailing-in its creditors, and also be blamed for  bailing-out a bank.   So there is a strong 
possibility that it will pick one of the two instead of trying to minimize the use of taxpayers’ 
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money.  Indeed, the resolution regime in the EU perhaps has foreseen the need to resort to 
public funds and has refrained from explicitly prohibiting bail-outs in the EU. 
 
Bail-outs or not, it should not be forgotten that in some cases, 120 the distinction between 
creditors and taxpayers is just technical.121   Therefore, even under a bail-in taxpayers may still 
be covering the bill indirectly, which although might be justifiable given the positive externalities 
the public enjoys from the services of the banking sector,122 it can equally create a public 
outrage, even in the absence of bail-outs.  Understandably, using the unguaranteed depositors 
of the bank to restructure it is not something that can be easily fathomed given that these 
persons had legitimate expectations, both contractually and socially, that they would 
continuously have access to their savings. 
 
The difference with putting the burden of resolution on the bank’s creditors is that it can alter 
the way in which bank creditors price credit risk.  This can discipline the bank’s moral hazard, 
but it can also affect the bank’s access to funding and in turn its ability to finance loans, which 
can be counterproductive for the growth of the economy. 
 
 
 
3.3 What would the economic implications of a credible regime be? 
 
 
Having  observed  the  implications  of  the  limited  credibility  of  the  resolution  regime,  it  is 
important to also reflect briefly upon some implications that a credible regime would have.123 
 
Firstly, as discussed above, a credible regime affects the bank’s cost of funding because it 
increases credit default risk and places the losses flowing from the risk expressly on the bank’s 
creditors and shareholders. 
 
On this front, the regime seems to be perceived as substantially credible, since the implicit 
subsidy benefitting bigger banks due to the limited credibility of the regime appears to have 
been limited only to Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).124 That is, 
astonishingly, larger banks (other than SIFIs), paid higher premium with respect to their 
smaller peers in 2012.125  This is arguably because as the paper showed, only smaller 
banks entering resolution can be resolved without resorting to bail-outs.  This leaves larger 
banks exposed during resolution if indeed no bail-out takes place, increasing their risk and as  
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such, their cost of capital. 
 
At the same time, a credible regime would probably entail holding higher amounts of bail- 
inable debt, which would make the institution safer, and thus decrease its cost of funding. 
Nevertheless, the argument that higher capital adequacy standards would result in decreasing 
the amount of loans given by banks applies equally to the requirement of higher bail-inable 
debt.  If that is true, then a credible resolution regime could contribute to the slow recovery and 
growth of the real economy, or so the argument is usually solicited by banks.  However, this 
view has been highly contested, and the view that more capital equals not only safer 
institutions, but also more money available to lend, is gaining momentum.127 
 
Secondly,  creating  a  fund  that  can  ensure  the  credibility  of  the  regime  entails  serious 
opportunity costs.  It has been argued above that the ESM’s capacity to credibly play the role 
of the ultimate fiscal backstop for the SRM in a major systemic crisis is limited because its 
target level for its DRI, set at EUR 60 billion128 (out of its EUR 500 billion total lending capacity), 
is set too low to be able to deal with a major crisis. 129 However, creating a resolution 
fund with high-enough target levels to accommodate any given bank’s resolution in the 
absence of a formal European lender of last resort would cause massive opportunity losses 
for the funds put aside for resolution.  Therefore, it would arguably not be justified in a 
cost-benefit analysis, especially given that it has been showed above that even currently the 
bank resolution regime affects the cost of funding for banks.131 
 
As such, only the ECB, a central bank which can create unlimited amounts of cash,132 can play 
this role of the lender of last resort and not the ESM which has been built to tackle only liquidity 
and solvency problems.133   However, these arrangements are not in place in Europe.   The 
ECB  has  a  very  limited  mandate  for  discharging  LoLR  powers  both  expressly  and 
institutionally, given the absence of fiscal union and/or fiscal powers in the Eurozone.  Only 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
A Admati P M DeMarzo M F Hellwig P Pfleiderer, ‘Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital 
Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive’ (2013) Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 
2013/23 1-70; Thorsten V Koeppl ‘How complicated is bank regulation?’ Youtube < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtqOhNvYqUw>; see ECB, ‘The impact of the CRR and CRD IV on bank financing 
Eurosystem response to the DG FISMA consultation paper’ (December 2015) 
128 
Eurogroup document on ESM’s DRI (above n) 
129 
M Hellwig (above n 32) 17; IMF, ‘2014 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area: Concluding Statement of the 
IMF Mission’ (June 19, 2014), para. 10 
131 
Bongini et al (above n) 
132 
This is in line with Minsky’s finding that to deal with a systemic crisis, a state needs a ‘Big Bank’, that is a 
central bank to act as a LoLR to provide ample liquidity to the banking system, and a ‘Big Government’, that is a 
Treasury to provide finance for banks solvency: H Minsky, Stabilizing the Unstable Economy (Yale University 
Press, 1986) 279 – 282; G Zavvos S Kaltsouni (above n 50) 
133 
P De Grauwe, ‘The European Central Bank: The Lender of Last Resort in the Government Bond Market?’, 
CESIFO Working Paper, No 3569 , September 2011; G S Zavvos S Kaltsouni (above n 50) 
Page 19 of23  
fiscal  authorities  can carry  out  bailouts  using  taxpayers'  money,  constraining  therefore  the 
ECB's ability to act as a LoLR.
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4. Conclusion 
The paper has looked at the different financing avenues available for resolving a bank and 
found that the funding available might not be sufficient in every given case.  The inadequacy of 
the funds can limit the credibility of the regime, and as such it can have important economic 
implications.   These implications include: the need to use public funds for bank resolution 
where resolution funds are inadequate; how the need to also use public funds can influence 
the  decision  of  a  sovereign  to  place  a  bank  in  resolution  first;  and  the  creation  of 
inconsistencies on the cost of funding of different banks either making it cheaper for certain 
institutions to access funding because they still enjoy an implicit public subsidy, depending on 
the creditworthiness of their sovereign, or making it more expensive because they are too big 
to be covered by the resolution funds, but not systemic enough to enjoy a public subsidy. 
 
Therefore, regardless of whether the funds will be enough for resolving banks in practice, the 
resolution regime’s impact lies in the credibility of its design, which shapes the corresponding 
implications stemming from it depending on whether the regime is credible, non-credible, or 
limitedly credible.  What level of credibility is most desirable is a complicated question, as even 
a fully-credible regime might have severe implications that might be undesirable. 
 
In the end, a balance must be sustained.  The resolution regime must be credible enough to 
achieve financial stability by materially influencing risk-pricing, but it must be wary of impairing 
the real economy either by harming confidence in the banking system of a country because of 
the bail-in tool or by negatively-influencing loan-granting, either because it is causing massive 
opportunity losses by creating a fund so big that massive amounts of funds are put aside for 
the off-chance a resolution takes place, or because the credit risk of the bank’s instruments is 
too detrimental to its funding cost and therefore its access to finance. 
 
Arguably, as it stands the regime currently achieves this balance.  The regime is credible for 
small banks, thus affecting their funding costs, but it also affects the funding costs of bigger 
banks (even more severely as found by Bongini et al) because its limited credibility makes 
resolving such bigger banks more dangerous when no bail-out takes place.  At the same time, 
it is not fully credible and it does not create massive funds carrying massive opportunity costs. 
Therefore, despite the many criticisms attached to the regime, it might be a good compromise 
in the absence of fiscal powers for the ECB to act as a lender of last resort - at least until a SIFI 
experiences difficulties. 
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